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The two contradictions encompassed in the title of this essay 
reflect those to be found in Henry Watterson's History of the Spanish-
American War, Embracing a Complete Review of Our Relations with 
Spain. Published in 1898, with a preface dated a full two months 
before the signing of the Treaty of Paris that officially concluded the 
war, this "history" is one that Watterson freely admits was written 
concurrently with the events it purports to describe impartially. 
Watterson himself was something of a contradiction: a Confederate 
war veteran who supported a strong and undivided Union; a fervent 
southern Democrat who advocated expansion, though not 
imperialism, as a means of attaining free trade; and a longstanding 
editor of the Louisville Courier-journal whose colorfully-worded and 
impassioned editorials impacted political discourse on a national 
level, but who scorned the trends of sensationalism and yellow 
journalism. Indeed, it should be noted that initially Watterson's own 
opinions on the war and the acquisition of overseas territories were 
far from the crystallized viewpoint he presents in his not-
unsubstantial 660-page volume. Nor were they as coolheaded as the 
book's clear attempts to offer balanced accounts of motivations and 
causes of events in the war, which certainly tones down the 
enthusiasm Watterson had progressively developed for the war and 
the expansionist opportunities it presented. 1 
1 Henry Watterson, History of the Spanish-American War, Embracing a Complete Review 
of Our Relations with Spain, (New York: Werner Company, I 898), ix; Allen Johnson and 
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Nonetheless, the overall value of Watterson's work is without 
question more historiographical than historical. Interestingly, this 
view is shared by a contemporary review of the book, which predicts 
that its chief merit in the future would be its insight into the national 
mindset at one of the most significant turning points in the history of 
the United States.2 The aim of this paper is to examine the conception 
of imperialism presented by Watterson in his book, and to identify the 
place this conception occupied in the larger scheme of national 
imperialist policymaking. Furthermore, discussion will be devoted to 
the extent to which the book was in a position to influence public 
opinion in the United States, and to what extent the ideologies and 
interpretations promoted in the book were or were not comparable to 
those being disseminated in political discourse, in other similar 
contemporary works, and even in later historical works. Ultimately, 
such an examination would seem to suggest that in a number of 
respects, the interpretations of Watterson and his contemporaries 
prevailed to a significant extent in the twentieth-century 
historiography of the Spanish-American war. 
Watterson's book constitutes an important and unique part of 
the historiographical and ideological movement towards United States 
imperialism, in that it was illustrative of the emerging ambitions of 
overseas colonialism, while also attempting to foster in the larger 
population a particular understanding of the war that supported these 
same ambitions. This "history" must necessarily be viewed as distinct 
Dumas Malone, "Henry Watterson," Dictionary of American Biography, Authors Edition 
vol. XIX, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936): 552; Daniel S. Margolies, Henry 
Watterson and the New South: The Politir::s of Empire, Free Trade, and Globalization 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 14, 139. 
2 Alfred Shaw, review of History of the Spanish-American War. written by Henry 
Watterson, The American Monthly Review of Reviews 20 (1899): 120, Coogle Books, 
accessed October 9, 2013. 
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from a large portion of Watterson's editorials and orations in the 
sense that it was written for, and indeed reached, a more 
geographically and ideologically varied readership. Notwithstanding 
this, it seems clear that the idea of the United States taking a more 
active supervisory role, not in world affairs so much as in a limited 
colonial context that nonetheless had broad international 
implications, was not one that would necessarily have surprised U.S. 
citizens-though certainly there were those who objected to it. 
Imperial and colonial ambitions of course often masqueraded behind 
republican paternalistic rhetoric, and their proponents absolutely split 
hairs and skewed traditional interpretations of history (perhaps not 
entirely inaccurately-the new trend of viewing manifest destiny as 
the establishment of a continental empire, which was certainly 
embraced by Watterson, is a prime example), but it was nonetheless 
in the last years of the nineteenth century an increasingly familiar and 
even favorable concept to a considerable and influential body of 
politicians and the public. And indeed even after the war, Watterson 
continued to agitate for maintaining a presence in the United States' 
newly acquired territories, because he believed that to do otherwise 
was "antagonistic to Jefferson and Jackson, both 'apostles of National 
expansion."'3 
Watterson's History of the Spanish-American War is structured 
largely chronologically, and consists of thirty-two chapters, beginning 
with a discussion of the causes and the declaration of war and ending 
with a summary of the peace negotiations. The former is simplified 
almost to the point of distortion, skating over events prior to 1898, 
and mentioning only that the U.S. public had sympathized with Cuban 
3 Margolies, Henry Watterson, 1 24; Theodore Roosevelt, Colonial Policies of the United 
States, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc.: 1937), 39-40; 
"Watterson's Warning," New York Times, September 19, 1899, pg. 6. 
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attempts at insurrection "as a general thing, and in a general way." In 
fact, Cubans had been making active attempts to enact revolution at 
various intervals as early as 1825, including a number of filibustering 
expeditions, and upon the renewal of such efforts in 1895, the U.S. 
press began to maintain a significant presence in Cuba. 4 As editor of 
a prominent newspaper that covered in-depth events leading up to 
the war, it is inconceivable that Watterson would not have been 
capable of conveying in more detail the historical and political context 
of the struggles of the independentistas against Spain, had he chosen 
to do so. Moreover, the U.S. government had a long diplomatic 
history of expressing its interest in Cuban affairs, dating as far back 
as john Quincy Adams. As Henry Cabot Lodge made a point of noting, 
"the Cuban question is not a new one."s 
It is highly significant, then, that Watterson chooses instead to 
emphasize the sense of surprise following the explosion of the Maine, 
rather than to establish a more detailed chronology of Spanish-U.S.-
Cuban relations. And indeed, throughout the book it is his marked 
tendency to underline instances in which the U.S. government and 
public were taken by surprise in the face of both the actions it 
deemed as necessary to undertake, and the (colonial) responsibilities 
which resulted from these actions. Without necessarily making a 
statement on the genuineness of this surprise, it can be viewed as a 
clear attempt to minimize the impression of a calculated imperial 
policy. Such is certainly the case with regard to what Watterson refers 
to as "the Philippines question," which is his first real mention of 
4 Watterson, History, 22; Charles H. Brown, The Correspondents' War: journalists in the 
Spanish-American War(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 6. 
s Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Duty to Cuba," The Forum XXI (1896): 278; Amos S. Hershey 
makes the same point in "The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency," Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 7 (May 1 896): 76. 
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imperialist ambitions. (Here, additionally, it is noteworthy that 
Watterson chooses to devote considerable discussion in the same vein 
to another question-the "Eastern" one, which concerned the balance 
of power between European nations, China, and Japan following the 
Shimonoseki treaty and its implications for these powers to become 
involved or intervene in the Spanish-American War. It also concerned 
the possibilities for establishing U.S. trading rights, a point Watterson 
does not fail to make. Incidentally, this same situation led to the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904, in the peace negotiations of which the 
United States under Theodore Roosevelt played a significant role.)6 
This is all in line with Louis A. Perez's conception of the 
historiography of 1 898. Perez holds that historians and 
contemporaries posited one of two versions of the sequence of events 
following the infamous explosion. According to one version, public 
opinion was galvanized towards war immediately; in the other, the 
U.S. public waited calmly for the verdict of the naval inquiry before 
bowing to the necessity of war with Spain. Watterson presents 
somewhat of a combination of these two 'versions.' He praises the 
military and administrative leaders for their prudence and restraint in 
not taking immediate action, but also notes that "whilst the trend of 
public opinion was not long shaping itself, and falling into the theory 
of treachery, the more thoughtful among the people of the United 
States could not bring themselves to believe this possible." 7 
An understanding of overall trends in the historiography of the 
war, beginning as early as 1 898, is especially important given that 
6 Watterson, History, 404-407. 
7 Louis A. Perez, The War of 1898: the United States and Cuba in History and 
Historiography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 67; Watterson, 
History, 37. 
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Watterson's book is far from the only one of its kind. A goodly 
number of other "histories" of the Spanish-American War were 
published in the two years after the war, and Watterson is not even 
unique in having published a history the same year as the war itself-
a feat he only managed by omitting the finalization of peace terms, as 
will be discussed.s In the July to December 1899 issue of the 
American Monthly Review of Reviews, three of sixteen books in the 
history and biography section were explicitly about the war. While this 
number in itself may not seem especially significant, another two 
books in this section were about the recently annexed Hawaii (which 
was very relevant to the Spanish-American War in several ways that 
will be discussed below), one discussed U.S. "prospects, problems, 
and duties" in the Pacific, and yet another concerned the beginnings 
of the colonial system. Furthermore, under the travel and description 
section, three books were devoted to the nation's new possessions in 
8 Examples include but are by no means limited to: Elridge S. Brooks, The Story of Our 
War with Spain, (Boston: lothrop Publishing Company, 1899); Henry Cabot lodge, The 
War with Spain, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1899); Nathan C. Green, The War with 
Spain and Story of Spain and Cuba, (Baltimore: International News and Book Co., 1898); 
Prescott Holmes, Young People's History of the War with Spain, (Philadelphia: H. 
Altemus Co., 1900); Henry F. Keenan, The Conflict with Spain, (Philadelphia, C. W. 
Ziegler & Co., 1898); Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, Theodore Roosevelt, and Richard 
Wainright, Cuba's Struggle Against Spain, (New York: The American Historical Press, 
1899); James Rankin Young, History of Our War with Spain, (Philadelphia: National 
Publishing Co., 1898); Theodore Roosevelt, The Rough Riders, (New York: C. Scribner's 
Sons, 1899); john Randolph Spears, Our Navy in the War with Spain, (New York: C. 
Scribner's Sons, 1898); Trumbull White, Our War with Spain for Cuba's Freedom, 
(Philadelphia: Monarch Book Co., 1898); Marrion Wilcox, A Short History of Our War 
with Spain, (New York: F. A. Stokes, 1898). It is interesting to note the overwhelming 
similarities in many of the titles of these works, and their implicit understanding of the 
war as "ours," that is, being the domain of the United States against Spain, often 
without any mention of Cuba or other affected territories. 
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the Caribbean and the Pacific. Four books were also about the recent 
discovery of gold in the Klondike. Overall, U.S. writers (and, it seems 
safe to assume, readers as well) in 1898 and the years immediately 
after displayed a notable preoccupation with not only the war, but 
also with newly acquired territories and the economic possibilities 
they offered. With regards to both the Spanish-American War and the 
Klondike, the element of adventure as a source of interest should not 
be overlooked either.9 
Watterson's final chapter does not even mention the peace 
treaty in its official document form, which was signed in Paris on 
December 1 0, 1898-likely after the book had already been sent to 
the printers. Instead, Watterson closes his narrative with an account 
of the treaty terms verbally agreed upon on November 28, followed 
by a brief reiteration of the main arguments for and against 
imperialism, which he also summarizes earlier in the book 
subsequent to his description of the victory at Manila Bay. It is of note 
that in each case, Watterson makes a clear effort to present both 
sides, without explicitly expressing support for either, and observing 
that only time. would tell which arguments were more valid. 
Nonetheless, in his final paragraph, Watterson employs rhetoric 
reminiscent of earlier proponents of manifest destiny when he 
expresses his confidence that 
the untoward events of the war with Spain were 
brought about for some all-wise purpose by the 
Supreme Ruler of men, and that that hand which has 
9 Shaw, Review of Reviews, 118-120; Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (Boston: 
Little Brown and Co., 1958), 10. 
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led American manhood through every emergency to 
the one goal of the American Union, has in store for 
that Union even greater uses and glory than irradiated 
the dreams and blessed the prayers of the God-fearing 
men who gave it life.1o 
Indeed, ideological polemics surrounding the imperialist 
debate are one of the few pertinent divisive categories of 
classification within the United States Watterson addresses in any 
depth. Others are scarcely mentioned, or are omitted entirely, 
throughout The History of the Spanish-American War. These include 
distinctions between southerners and northerners, between 
Democrats and Republicans, and between whites and racial 
minorities. Watterson's regional and party identity as a southern 
Democrat are readily identifiable in the vast majority of his writings; 
what can be deduced from their scant presence in this volume is the 
scope and diversity of his intended audience. 
The book was in fact published in a variety of locales 
throughout the United States. Watterson's own Courier-journal Press 
printed copies in Louisville, but in 1898 no less than thirty-one other 
companies also printed the book in at least seventeen other cities 
ranging as far from the South as San Francisco. Nor can one ignore 
Watterson's status as a prominent opinion leader whose editorials 
were sought out by New York newspapers upon which the rest of the 
country's periodicals were typically modeled.ll In fact, tickets to a 
10 Watterson, History, 623-24. 
11 "Formats and editions of 'History of the Spanish-American war; embracing a 
complete review of our relations with Spain,"' WorldCat, accessed October 9, 2013; 
Margolies, Henry Watterson, 2. 
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speech he gave to the Patria Club on the issue of colonial expansion 
were so sought after that the club was compelled to "depart from its 
custom," charging for a limited number of guest tickets. The same 
speech was also written up in a New York Times article, further 
underlining the interest Watterson's opinions held for the reading 
public.12 Watterson's prominence as a writer and an orator, along 
with the widespread publication of his History, therefore 
demonstrates the extent to which the U.S. public would have been 
conscious of, and had access to, the book. Its collection of seventy 
photos and illustrations, some in full-color foldouts, accentuate the 
impression of a book intended to inform a large and varied 
readership in an entertaining and persuasive manner. It is thus 
unsurprising that Watterson would have moderated his rhetoric 
somewhat with this in mind, so as to avoid alienating readers from his 
overall attempt to chronicle the events of the war and their 
significance for the nation's future. 
Divisions between North and South are mentioned only in 
order to represent them as a thing of the past. Watterson makes 
direct reference to the Civil War and praises the emergence of a 
"regenerated Union" no longer torn apart by sectional controversy; 
moreover, he characterizes the Spanish-American War as an ideal 
opportunity to demonstrate, to the world and to the nation itself, the 
strength of a unified democratic population. Rather oddly, he 
describes the nonpartisan feeling of cooperation that accompanied 
the massive rush of voluntary enlistment following the declaration of 
war as "exhilarating and at the same time pathetic." Thus it can be 
inferred that Watterson was perhaps not so unequivocally in favor of 
12 "Henry Watterson on Expansion," New York Times, (December 6, 1898): 11; 
"Watterson on Expansion: Great Questions of External Policy May Lure the American 
Spirit Away From Money Worship," New York Times, (December 10, 1898): 3. 
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political unity as he may have liked to affect. Moreover, this 
discussion is immediately followed by the contradiction-laden 
declaration that 
the swaddling clothes of National babyhood were gone. The 
giant stood forth in all the pride of his manhood ... arrayed on 
the side of liberty and humanity, ready, willing, and able to 
give battle to all comers who might challenge his supremacy, 
wherever he might plant the star-spangled banner or set up 
the standards of free government.n 
The United States is thus characterized as seeking to establish liberty 
and humanity along with supremacy, free government along with 
territorial claims. The use of flag-planting imagery is especially 
strong in its imperialistic associations. Nonetheless, what is perhaps 
most significant about the views presented in this passage is the fact 
that, to Watterson (and perhaps to many of his readers and 
contemporaries as well) they do not appear to have been perceived as 
necessarily conflicting. 
Race as a divisive category is mentioned in the History, but 
only in the context of relations with Britain, and as a means of 
asserting the homogeneity and Anglo-Saxon origin of the population 
of the United States. When Watterson makes a point of praising U.S. 
democracy for its inclusion of "any male child born in the United 
States" in the political process to the point of being eligible for the 
presidency, in contrast to the prevalence of "privileged castes" under 
1; Watterson, History, 79-80. 
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the monarchical government in Britain, he rather blatantly ignores the 
racially motivated political oppression of black Americans and other 
minorities. 14 This is a tactic Watterson employed not only in his 
History of the Spanish-American War, however. In a speech he gave at 
the seventy-fifth anniversary of General Ulysses Grant's birthday, he 
asserted, "it has taken but a few weeks to impress upon the reunited 
section of the Union that we are the most homogeneous people on 
the face of the globe." Watterson's expression of a U.S. identity 
constituting part of a larger Anglo-Saxon racial and cultural heritage 
was by no means unique for this period.1s 
On the other hand, however, many anti-imperialists in the 
United States worried that to follow Britain's example in establishing 
overseas colonies was to abandon the country's traditional 
commitment to republican values, and with this in mind they invoked 
arguments of national exceptionalism. Watterson's twofold solution 
to this is a most interesting one. First of all, rather than accepting this 
view of the United States following Britain, he reversed the model and 
contended that, in fact, "the British people have studied the United 
States, and have. themselves erected a great republic attired in the 
robes only of monarchy and imperialism." Secondly, he maintained 
that any empire built on the foundations of free trade was naturally 
also a free empire.16 
14 Ibid., 393. 
1s "Grant Birthday Dinner: Monument Association Honors the Memory of the Dead 
Soldier and Statesman," New York Times, (April 28, 1898): 5; Paul A. Kramer, "Empires, 
Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States 
Empires, 1880-191 0," The journal of American History 88, no. 4 (March 2002): 1315-
16. 
16 Ibid., 1339; Watterson, History, 398. 
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Watterson was certainly an ardent supporter of free trade, 
which he viewed as the means of "achieving prosperity and stability 
through expanding global markets and the open door." 17 Even before 
1898 and the opportunities it offered for overseas markets, Watterson 
was quite vocal against a number of tariffs, asserting his belief in 
1896 that "the American manufacturer no longer needs protection." 1B 
This part of his political program was very much rooted in his desire 
to see the South come into its own economically. Watterson was in a 
way quite anticipatory in his understanding that this would require a 
number of modern elements, including the incorporation of as many 
free trade markets as possible, though it is of note that he was not 
always an advocate of U.S. colonial expansion. Some evolution of 
opinion is only to be expected from a man with as enduring a career 
as Watterson. Indeed, his role as a regional and national opinion 
leader in the model of earlier 'personal journalists' began with his 
transition into newspaper editing following his service in the 
Confederate Army, included a brief foray into elected officialdom as a 
Democratic congressman in 1876, and was marked a year before his 
retirement by his being awarded a 1917 Pulitzer Prize for his 
editorials. 19 
Watterson in fact exhibited a similar shift in opinion 
concerning the question of the annexation of Hawaii, which was in 
many ways connected to various crucial issues of the Spanish-
American War. Thomas Osborne refutes the traditional military 
explanation for Hawaiian annexation, which holds that the United 
States viewed Hawaii as strategically necessary to the war effort 
17 Margolies, Henry Watterson, 14-1 5. 
1B"Watterson on Politics: Union of Republicans and Democrats Cannot Last," New York 
Times, November 29, 1896, pg. 5. 
19 johnson and Malone, "Henry Watterson," 552-555. 
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because of its location between the continental U.S. and the 
Philippines, and because it could be used to defend the West Coast 
during and after the war. Moreover, Osborne asserts in its place a less 
direct explanation that has its roots in trade. He demonstrates that 
overall it was the desire to control more markets for U.S. 
manufacturers, so as not to glut the domestic market, which 
motivated the annexation of Hawaii even before a decision had been 
made with regards to the Philippines.2o 
Of course, the small islands of Hawaii themselves would not 
be the location of these new markets, but rather would facilitate 
opening up trade with China and other Asian nations. Watterson's 
similar concern with this possibility has already been discussed in the 
context of the "Eastern question," and Daniel Margolies asserts that 
Watterson's shift to support annexation illustrated the salience of his 
free trade ambitions over his reservations about the racial dissolution 
of the United States that could accompany annexation of a nation of 
peoples he perceived as being inferior. In his History, Watterson 
understandably makes no mention of such concerns, and represents 
the need for annexation on terms very similar to those used by the 
McKinley administration in its (intentionally misleading, in Osborne's 
analysis) attempts to win Congress over to its cause-that is, he 
argues that "if the Philippines were to be held, the annexation of 
Hawaii was logically necessary for strategic and economic reasons." It 
would seem, then, that the long-held historical view of the 
annexation of Hawaii as a military expedient, rather than as 
commercially motivated, cannot be entirely separated from 
20 Thomas J. Osborne, "Trade or War? America's Annexation of Hawaii Reconsidered," 
Pacific Historical Review 50, no. 3 (August 1981 ): 287, 298. 
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contemporary attempts in 1898 to make it understood in that 
context.2 1 
In his assessment of the motivations for the Spanish-American 
War, Louis Perez makes an important distinction between U.S. 
policymakers and popular sentiment. As demonstrated above, at 
times Watterson very knowingly represented situations in the same 
ways as U.S. policymakers, and for the same reasons. For the most 
part, however, his History of the Spanish-American War anticipates 
the marked trend in U.S. historiography of 1898 to attribute the 
movement of war to public opinion as a kind of overwhelming force 
that was in many ways influenced by the press.zz 
Interestingly, a good deal of the historical literature on the war 
is either unaware of, or chooses to ignore, the well-established 
historical precedent of U.S. interest in Cuba. As previously mentioned, 
both Henry Cabot Lodge and Amos S. Hershey, writing in 1896 in 
favor of U.S. support of Cuba, demonstrate a clear understanding of 
this aspect of U.S. interests. Cabot Lodge, of course, was a long-term 
player in U.S. foreign policy, while Hershey was a Harvard-educated 
political scientist. As such, both were clearly in a position to comment 
on the motivations of the administration for involving itself in the 
Cuban struggle against Spain.23 
Watterson's portrayal of the U.S. popular response, on the 
other hand, presents a public opinion that was overwhelmingly in 
favor of war for the purpose of liberating Cuba. Such a portrayal 
should by no means be viewed as inaccurate or disingenuous-as 
21 Margolies, Henry Watterson, 190; Watterson, History, 418; Osborne, "Trade or War?", 
290. 
22 Perez, The War of 1898, 35-36. 
23 "Dr. A. 5. Hershey, Educator, Is Dead," New York Times, June 13, 1933, pg. 19. 
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Perez notes, contemporary popular narratives and music provide 
ample evidence of the genuine desire on the part of many individuals 
in the U.S. to see Cubans freed from what they perceived as the 
despotic and oppressive rule of the Spanish. Nonetheless, it is 
essential to understand that in many ways the views presented by 
Watterson and his contemporaries, of the war having been entered 
into on Cuba's behalf, have been perpetuated despite only 
representing partial truths. (In this vein, the advent of the Anti-
Imperialist League will also be examined below.)24 
Perez also points out, rightly, that the name given to the war 
itself is not without significant implications regarding the United 
States' motivations for, and popular conception of, the war (and 
indeed, it is no doubt for this reason that he chooses to refer to it 
instead as the "war of 1898"). The construction "Spanish-American 
War" makes no reference to any of the territories acknowledged as 
falling under the control of the United States in the 1898 Treaty of 
Paris. Moreover, its use even before the advent of the war anticipates 
to some extent its expansion out of the domain of Cuba and into 
Pacific territories. distributed over a wide geographic expanse. That is 
to say, it rather conveniently allowed for the acquisition of territory on 
the sole basis that such territory was previously under Spanish 
control. Jill Lepore makes the same point in her study of the 1675 
King Philip's War, asserting that "acts of war generate acts of 
narration, and ... both types of acts are often joined in a common 
purpose: defining the geographical, political, cultural, and sometimes 
racial and national boundaries between people." This idea is central to 
24 Perez, The War of 1898,24. 
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this paper's approach to studying Watterson's History in the larger 
context of the historiography of the Spanish-American War.2s 
And indeed, even the choice of title of Watterson's history of 
the war has similar implications that are worth examining. It of course 
includes the name of the war itself-which, incidentally, most 
contemporary books on the war did not (see footnote 1 2). But beyond 
that, its subtitle is also of interest, claiming as it does to embrace a 
complete review of the United States' relations with Spain. One could 
argue that the book simultaneously achieves a great deal more and 
less than that. It displays an impressive consciousness of 
international politics and relations involving various European powers, 
to be discussed in more detail below, while also presenting a 
decidedly United States-centric and narrow impression of Spain's 
government and population. The former is perhaps surprising, the 
latter most certainly is not. 
Throughout the History, Watterson makes use of a wealth of 
international and historical examples and parallels. For the most part, 
these display Watterson's broad knowledge base of world power 
relations. His understanding of the intricacies of Russo-Anglo-Sino-
Japanese relationships and their implications for U.S. trade interests 
are notable, and have already been mentioned. Nonetheless, his 
examples are not always historically accurate. His claim that in 
Manila, "at a distance of 6,000 leagues from Toledo and Granada, the 
same ancient hatreds have brought European Spaniards and Asiatic 
Saracen into the same relentless antagonism that swayed them in the 
days of the Cid and Ferdinand the Catholic" shows a basic ignorance 
(or disregard) of, for one, the cultural and ethnic differences between 
2s Ibid., xii; Jill Lepore, The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American 
/dentity(New York: Knopf, 1998}, x. 
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Filipinos and medieval Arab and Berber conquerors. For another, 
having made this erroneous equivalence, it ignores the fact that in the 
cases cited it was the Iberians who were the conquered and the 
"Saracens" the conquerors who were eventually driven out, an ironic 
reversal (according to Watterson's own assumptions, of course) one 
might expect him to make more of.26 
Relevant to his assessment of the significance of the Spanish-
American War is Watterson's characterization of the battles of 
Waterloo, Gettysburg, and Sedan as "incidents of locality" and "mere 
skirmishes" compared to the Battle of Santiago. He does concede that 
"Waterloo was, perhaps, greatest of all," but immediately mitigates 
this by adding "but the world of 1814 was much smaller than the 
world of 1 898." Perhaps more precisely, the United States was 
involved in the world on a much larger scale in 1 898 than in 1 814. (It 
is also worth noting, of course, that the battle of Waterloo took place 
in 1815, not 1814.) Nonetheless, the (rather inappropriately) 
grandiose nature of this assertion provides valuable insight to the 
weight given to the outcome of the war by Watterson, and presumably 
by many of his contemporaries.27 
Certainly other countries were aware of the import of the U.S. 
victory in 1 898. As has been discussed, Britain's involvement and 
promotion of an exercise of Anglo-Saxon imperialism by the United 
States certainly demonstrates its awareness of the possibilities of U.S. 
success against Spain. Other European nations such as Germany, 
Russia, and France made moves to intervene in the conflict before 
British support of the United States made this diplomatically 
undesirable. That the United States became a consideration in this 
26 Watterson, History, 86-89. 
27 Ibid., 382. 
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tendency to defend the status quo and maintain a balance of power 
with known quantities was a shift of which the European powers 
unquestionably took note. In Spain, a new literary movement known 
as Ia generaci6n del 98 ("the generation of '98") emerged in response 
to the loss of territory and imperial status that resulted from the war. 
This movement was characterized by a disenchantment with and 
sharp criticism of Spanish political, literary, and educational 
institutions, all of which were seen as being in crisis. A similar literary 
movement can be seen even in France, where the Spanish defeat by 
the United States "triggered a wave of books warning that all of 
European civilization was now threatened by the rise of foreign 
'barbarians."'2s Apparently even Pope Leo XIII was "much affected by 
the Spanish-American war," and the Times of London reported, "in 
view of his advanced age and the nervous condition in which his 
Holiness has been for some time past, his entourage feel some 
anxiety."29 And of course it goes without saying (though it should not) 
that those territories which now found themselves subject to U.S. 
occupation and oversight were unquestionably aware of the 
significance of the war. In many cases, this significance was not one 
of liberty or humanity, as proclaimed by Watterson and other 
idealists. 
28 "Lord Salisbury's Speech," The Times (London), November 11, 1898, pg. 3; 
Watterson, History, 439-465; Manuel Duran, "La tecnica de Ia novela y Ia generaci6n 
del 98," Revista Hispanica Moderna, 23 no. 1 Uanuary 1957): 15; jeremy D. Popkin, A 
History of Modern France, Fourth Edition (New York, Pearson: 2013), 188. 
29 "Court Circular," The Times (London), June 30, 1898, pg. 6. Incidentally, the article 
goes on to assure readers that "his Holiness's physician declares, however, that there is 
no ground for alarm," and indeed Leo Xlll's lengthy and productive pontificate, having 
begun in 1878, was to last five more years until his death in 1903; for a discussion of 
his reforms and encyclicals, see: Robert P. Kraynak, "Pope Leo XIII and the Catholic 
Response to Modernity," Modern Age 49, no. 4 (September 2007): 527-536. 
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The Spanish-American War represented not only the physical 
expansion of U.S. territory, but also the ideological expansion of the 
nation's perception of its role in the larger world. Just as Anglo-
Saxonism proved to be a remarkably short-lived phenomenon, so too 
was the public consciousness of U.S. attempts to engage in direct 
oversight of colonial possessions. Nonetheless, affairs in the newly 
acquired territories remained intimately tied to U.S. policymaking for 
decades after the end of the war. Cuban elections in 1900 saw an 
overwhelming victory by the independentistas, which was recognized 
by the U.S. Even so, political 'autonomy' was contingent on conceding 
to U.S. economic interests, and this state of affairs lasted until 
Castro's 1 959 revolution. The Platt Amendment, which in 1901 
nullified the earlier Teller Amendment (which prohibited the 
annexation of Cuba and guaranteed Cuban autonomy) and 
established a precedent for U.S. oversight in Cuban commercial, 
foreign policy, and military affairs, was the embodiment of this 
arrangement.3o The Philippines, having been directly purchased by 
the U.S. government, fought for several years against a colonial 
authority which refused to recognize its status as a Republic, was the 
site of substantial U.S. missionary efforts, and only gained full 
independence in 1 946, after having been invaded and occupied by 
the Japanese during WWII. Puerto Rico, of course, remains a U.S. 
commonwealth. 31 
3o Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism (Durham, Duke University Press: 
2008), 7-1 0; Perez, The War of1898, 1 29-131. 
31 Sharon Delmedo, The Star-Entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of American in the 
Philippines (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 10-11; Shinzo Hayase 
and David Levinson, "Philippines-History" Encyclopedia of Modern Asia 4 (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 2002): 505-508; Susan K. Harris, Cod's Arbiters: Americans 
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Significantly, however, initial moves towards imperialism in 
1898 did provoke widespread political discourse and debate on the 
matter from various elements in the United States, as is amply 
evidenced for example by the significant contribution of women to 
the efforts of the Anti-Imperialist League. The League was also 
supported by such diverse and prominent members as former 
president Grover Cleveland, steel magnate Andrew Carnegie, and 
American Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers.32 Moreover, 
the question of what to do with the newly-acquired territories of 
1898 was a highly polemical one in electoral politics immediately 
following the war, and even prompted some individuals to consider 
voting against their party affiliation. This was the case with 
Carnegie-though he ultimately supported a second term for 
McKinley, he freely admitted to having some initial doubts on this 
point, and in a New York Times interview in 1900 rated the question 
of imperialism as rather higher priority than the infamous silver issue, 
which he considered "a back number."33 While Watterson's History 
does address the arguments both for and against imperialism, 
without explicitly favoring either, he does not discuss the 
demographics of support for either side, and certainly does not give 
the impression that the debate was so polemical. And ultimately, as 
has been discussed, Watterson's own political views, his use of 
Anglo-Saxon rhetoric, and his depiction of the United States as a 
major power and player in world affairs all certainly placed him 
32 Erin L. Murphy, "Women' Anti-Imperialism, 'The White Man's Burden, and the 
Philippine-American War: Theorizing Masculinist Ambivalence in Protest," Gender and 
Society 23, No. 2 (April 2009): 245; "Anti-Imperialist League, Mr. Cleveland Consents to 
Serve as Vice President," New York Times, December 13, 1898, pg. 1. 
B "Mr. Carnegie Stands by His Own Party: Believes Americans May Trust it to Retrieve 
Errors," New York Times, September 30, 1900, pg. 4. 
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squarely on the side of imperialism, even if he preferred to 
euphemize it as "expansionism."34 
Another interesting rhetorical device present in pro-war 
arguments of the last years of the nineteenth century, and certainly 
also evident in Watterson's History, exists in the new 
conceptualization of "American manhood." Kristin Hoganson notes 
the way politicians in the 1890s began to play up any war experience 
they may have had, and that a new category of classification emerged 
before the war for those who had not served and were perceived as 
having become overly effeminate as a result of the comforts of their 
wealth. This category was the "dude," and such dudes were typically 
found in the Northeast. A distinction between "manly" and "moneyed" 
was often drawn, and it became more desirable for politicians to 
portray themselves as "manly" and "rough." Theodore Roosevelt's 
increased political prominence in the years and decades following his 
role as leader of his "Rough Riders" attests to this quite well, and his 
autobiographical writings clearly serve to remind the voting public of 
his "manliness."35 Interestingly, Admiral George Dewey also entered 
the presidential. lists in 1900, but unlike Roosevelt he was not 
successful in turning his brilliant reputation after the war into political 
capital. Watterson was in fact the first to propose Dewey as a 
potential presidential candidate, but by April 1 900 his enthusiasm for 
this idea had cooled and he was quoted in the New York Times saying 
that "Admiral Dewey's time to come out was two years ago, when his 
praises were on every lip." One rather wonders if this did not also 
34 Watterson, History, 619-624. 
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have something to do with Dewey committing a number of political 
blunders, and his loss of support from most quarters as the campaign 
progressed.36 To be sure, his autobiography, published in 1913, 
made no mention of his failed political aspirations, and it of course 
came too late to have the same kind of impact as did Roosevelt's 
memoir.3 7 
Certainly Watterson, as a Colonel who had served in the 
Confederate army and hailed from the South, would not have been 
considered a dude. It is quite easy to find references to both 
"American manhood" and "dudes" in his History, as Hoganson herself 
points out, as well as in his orations, such as the speech he gave at a 
Board of Trade Banquet in 1897. In a sense, the use of such rhetoric 
in Watterson's History can be viewed as a more oblique means of 
asserting both imperialistic aims and his desire for the South to 
resume a leading economic role, both within the country and 
internationally. 38 
Though Watterson does not include a discussion of the peace 
treaty itself, having apparently finished work on the book before the 
document's official promulgation, he does provide an outline of the 
main points agreed upon in Paris on November 28. These points 
included the cession of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, the Sulu 
Archipelago, and Guam by Spain to the United States, the 
36 'Western Leaders' Opinions," New York Times, April 5, 1900, pg. 2; "Dubious Outlook 
for 'Dewey Arch' Fund," New York Times, April 21, 1900, pg. 1; "McLean Deserts 
Dewey? States Positively in Columbus that the Admiral's Candidacy is to be Gradually 
Abandoned," New York Times, May 5, 1900, pg. 1. 
37 George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey, Admiral of the Navy(New York: Ams 
Press, 1969). 
38 Ibid., 121; Watterson, History, 79-80, 623-24; "Board of Trade Banquet: Henry 
Watterson's speech," New York Times, January 21, 1897, pg. 2. 
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unconditional relinquishment of sovereignty of Cuba, and the 
understanding that the United States would pay $20,000,000 to Spain 
in return for the cession of the Philippines. Furthermore, no indemnity 
would be obtained from Spain by the United States. All these 
provisions were indeed included in the December 10 peace treaty. 
Watterson's discussion is solely focused on territorial concessions and 
monetary concerns, however, and omits any mention of Spanish 
efforts to protect the personal, civil, religious, and property rights of 
its citizens residing in the conceded territories. These concerns are 
the subject of no less than seven of the treaty's seventeen total 
articles; another two articles address the merchant and commercial 
rights of both countries, and one article addresses Spain's right to 
establish consular offices in all of the conceded territories. 39 
Indeed, Watterson's emphasis on the monetary implications of 
the peace negotiations merits further discussion. In a chapter titled 
"Interesting Facts About War," more than two pages are devoted to 
establishing the historical precedent for exacting indemnities from a 
defeated nation. The subsequent seven pages involve a series of 
calculations attempting to approximate the total U.S. expenditure on 
the war-including such minutiae as the fact that, apparently, "to fire 
one 1 3-inch armor-piercing shell costs $ 560; to fire an 8-inch shell 
costs $1 34," followed up by the somewhat less precise observation 
that "many thousands of the latter and hundreds of the former were 
discharged during the war." The subtext of such a discussion seems 
clear: the United States had invested heavily in the war, and would 
have been perfectly justified in requiring Spain to pay a hefty 
39 Watterson, History, 618; "Treaty of Peace Between the United States and Spain; 
December 10, 1898," The Avalon Project, 2013, 
http: l/avalon.law.yale.edu !19th centurv/sp 1 898.asp, October 9, 201 3. 
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indemnity. That it did not do so, and in fact paid Spain for the 
privilege of assuming control of the conceded territories, was to be a 
sign of the nation's largesse and fair dealing; moreover, it 
distinguished the United States from European tradition and in so 
doing reinforced their moral high ground. No mention is made of 
Cuban expenditures or loss of life. 40 
Watterson certainly seems to fall into the category of historical 
writers who lauded the conduct and preparedness of the U.S. military 
in the war, and viewed the U.S. victory as the result of a combination 
of U.S. strengths and Spanish weaknesses. Cuban participation is 
hardly mentioned, and disparaged when it is mentioned, as Perez 
notes is characteristic of the vast majority of the historiography of the 
war. Watterson equates the massive enlistment of volunteers with 
army preparedness, and fails to mention at all the fact the short 
amount of time available to train these volunteers did not lend itself 
to the formation of a particularly effective fighting force. Indeed, 
recent historiographical reassessments of U.S. army and navy 
performance in the Spanish-American War have not been especially 
favorable. Watterson's inclusion of an anecdote from Camp Wikoff, in 
which it takes General Chaffey a mere three minutes to have a gun-
shy young solider "fighting like a veteran and cool as a cucumber," 
demonstrates a rather idealistic outlook of the process of training and 
preparing soldiers for war. The Spanish, on the other hand, Watterson 
characterizes categorically as a "race ... skillful only in the cunning of 
cruelty and deception." To be fair, he does make a point on several 
40 Watterson, History, 575-584, the quote is from pg. 581. 
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occasions to note the bravery of the Spanish officers and soldiers but 
always follows this with an assertion of their "utter incompetence."41 
An examination of Frank Freidel's A Splendid Little War can be 
interesting and useful as a comparison to the narrative of the war set 
out by Watterson, and in the context of Louis Perez's assertion that 
historiography of 1898 remained relatively static over time and 
underwent few significant revisions. Freidel's book-long a classic in 
the field, reprinted as recently as 2002-was published exactly fifty 
years after the Spanish-American War and Watterson's book, but 
there are some interesting parallels that can be noted. Freidel, too, 
presents the war as "basically ... a popular crusade to stop a seemingly 
endless revolution which was shattering Cuba." If anything, Freidel's 
account of events leading up to the war, and even of the infamous 
explosion of the Maine, is even more brief (and, frankly, reductionist) 
than is Watterson's. Unlike Watterson, he does not describe U.S. 
public opinion as waiting on the results of the naval inquiry, but 
rather paints a picture of an immediately "enraged" populace pointing 
its finger at Spain. A Splendid Little Wartakes even more advantage of 
the opportunity to depict the war visually, and includes more than 
three hundred photographs and illustrations. 42 
Perhaps one of the most striking similarities between Freidel 
and Watterson's depictions of the war is their nearly complete 
omission of any mention of the Cuban contribution to campaigns 
following the U.S. entrance into hostilities. Both tend to attribute the 
U.S. victory to the qualities and preparation of Spanish and U.S. 
41 Perez, The War of 1898, 83; joseph Smith, "The 'Splendid Little War' of 1898: a 
Reappraisal," Historical Association (1995): 23-24; Watterson, History, 77, 100, 594-
595. 
42 Perez, The War of 1898, 1 09; Freidel, A Splendid Little War, 5, 8. 
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soldiers, officers, governments, and vessels. Watterson is more 
glowing in his assessment of U.S. preparedness than is Freidel, to be 
sure, but even Freidel asserts a general competency on the part of the 
Navy that more recent scholars have disputed to some extent. Both 
authors also cite Spanish weakness as a major factor; Freidel claims 
that "only the incredible ineptitude of the Spaniards and the 
phenomenal luck of the Americans kept it from stretching into a 
struggle as long and full of disasters as the Boer War became for the 
British."43 
A more specific and very telling example of this tendency to 
neglect and diminish the import of Cuban contributions exists in the 
case of the Daiquiri landing. Perez observes that Freidel and other 
historians of the Spanish-American War tend to view this event with 
some puzzlement, questioning why the Spanish failed to prevent the 
U.S. landing. Indeed, Freidel begins his chapter on this event by 
stating that, "if the Spanish army had displayed even moderate 
initiative, it could have turned the landing at Daiquiri into one of the 
most costly and painful military disasters in United States history." 
Perez stresses the importance of the Cuban role in securing the 
landing site, and makes much of Freidel's failure to acknowledge this. 
Interestingly, Freidel does in fact acknowledge this contribution, 
asserting that General Shafter chose to make the landing on the basis 
of information provided by the Cubans that Daiquiri was only lightly 
defended by the Spaniards, and with regards to these "a Cuban 
regiment had promised to drive them out." Nonetheless, his repeated 
characterization of the lack of Spanish opposition to the landing as 
"almost miraculous" does demonstrate the relatively little weight he 
gave to this Cuban contribution, and Perez's point holds even if it is 
43 Smith, "A reappraisal," 23; Freidel, A Splendid Little War, 3. 
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perhaps overemphasized. Watterson, for his part, mentions the ease 
of the Daiquiri landing, noting that "the troops were disembarked 
without meeting the slightest resistance," but he does not make as 
much of this fact as does Freidel. Nor, for that matter, does he make 
any mention whatsoever of the role played by the Cubans in securing 
this landing. 44 
Another significant similarity in the works of Freidel and 
Watterson is the distinction each makes between U.S. goals in Cuba 
and the Philippines, respectively. As has been discussed, Watterson 
introduces the idea of imperialist motivations or territorial ambitions 
only with what he calls the "Philippines question." Freidel does the 
same, asserting at the beginning of his book that the declaration of 
war was in no way motivated by expansionist concerns, but stating 
rather plainly that "already [in July] in Washington there was a 
disposition to feel that although the war was being fought to free 
Cuba, the Philippines would be legitimate spoils." Watterson's History 
was of course published too soon to include a discussion of post-
1898 developments, but Freidel certainly could have devoted more 
analysis to the fate of the Philippines, not to mention Cuba or any of 
the other acquired territories. Instead, he spares little more than a 
paragraph to mourn the money and time necessary to put down the 
Filipino insurrection (ironically similar to the Boer War he cites as a 
contrasting image of the Spanish-American War at the beginning of 
his book), and the cruelty U.S. soldiers resorted to in so doing. Still, 
he characterizes even this as merely "the sad prelude to the 
establishment of a model colonial administration and a slow 
preparation of the Filipinos for self-government," and he goes on to 
44 Perez, The War of 1898, 86, 102-1 04; Freidel, A Splendid Little War, 81-88; 
Watterson, History, 196. 
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say "the insurrection did little to mar the great victory celebrations 
when Admiral Dewey finally returned home."4s 
Though of course Freidel is only one example of a historian of 
the Spanish-American War, it is striking to see the similarities 
between his treatment of events and that of Watterson. Indeed, it is 
remarkably difficult to find a U.S. history of the war, regardless of 
when it was written, that gives a detailed account of the process by 
which the United States assumed and relinquished administrative 
authority in its new territories after the Treaty of Paris was signed. 
The "legacy" of 1898 inevitably seems to be interpreted as referring 
narrowly to the subsequent military restructuring or more generally to 
the U.S. assumption of a new place in world affairs and international 
politics. The specifics of the nation's foray into overseas colonialism 
are ultimately neglected, and perhaps contemporary historians have 
not moved so very far from the basic assumptions and interpretations 
present in the kind of instant history written by Henry Watterson in 
1 898. More so even than imperialist rhetoric and aims, the legacy of 
the Spanish-American War in United States historiography seems to 
be the prevalence of an almost exclusively U.S.-centric treatment of 
events. 
In conclusion, then, Henry Watterson's History of the Spanish-
American War is interesting primarily for two reasons. First of all, it 
differs considerably in tone and approach from Watterson's stridently 
opinionated editorials and orations, omitting mention of or skating 
over divisive categories related to race, region, and party affiliation. In 
so doing, Watterson aligned himself with the general-though by no 
means uncontested-trends in contemporary efforts to explain the 
war's causes, its relatively quick success, and its implications for 
45 Freidel, A Splendid Little War, 280, 304-306. 
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foreign policy in the future. Specifically, emphasis was placed on the 
entrance to the war as something of a spontaneous occurrence, on 
the decisive nature of U.S. contributions to the war effort, and on the 
country's responsibilities (rather than opportunities) in the 
administration and oversight of acquired territories. The second main 
point of interest exists in the appearance of many of these same 
themes, relatively unchanged, in the work of later prominent 
historians such as Frank Freidel. Indeed, to this extent it would seem 
that Henry Watterson and his contemporaries were successful in 
branding as "history" their take on events that were at the time still 
quite current. 
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